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This paper discusses the role of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in the market for carbon quotas and countries' commitments to reduce their carbon emission levels. We show that the CDM contributes to an efficient funding of ...
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This paper discusses the role of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in the market for carbon quotas and countries' commitments to reduce their carbon emission levels. We show that the CDM contributes to an efficient funding of clean technology investments in least developed countries. However, the CDM is not neutral on the global level of carbon emissions as it entices countries to raise their emission caps. The CDM may also make inappropriate the inclusion of any country that takes no emission abatement commitment. It can even make inefficient a country's decision to commit to an emission target. The implications of the presence of non-additional projects are also analyzed.
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The paper analyzes the strategic behavior of several countries engaged in capital accumulation, pollution mitigation, and environmental adaptation in the context of an environmental common good. Both cooperative and non-cooperativ...
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The paper analyzes the strategic behavior of several countries engaged in capital accumulation, pollution mitigation, and environmental adaptation in the context of an environmental common good. Both cooperative and non-cooperative strategies are discussed. The non-cooperative strategy is a dynamic game in which each country makes its own environmental decision following the open-loop Nash equilibrium. The cooperative social planner problem assumes an international environmental agreement in force. The non-cooperative and cooperative solutions are compared in the symmetric case of two countries and extended to several identical countries. It is shown that the non-cooperative strategy in multi-country world leads to over-production, over-consumption, over-pollution, and over-adaptation. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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That climate policies are costly is evident and therefore often create major fears. But the alternative (no action) also has a cost. Therefore, mitigation costs netted of the damage costs avoided are the only figure that can serio...
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That climate policies are costly is evident and therefore often create major fears. But the alternative (no action) also has a cost. Therefore, mitigation costs netted of the damage costs avoided are the only figure that can seriously be considered as the "genuine cost" of a policy. We elaborate on this view of a policy's cost by distinguishing between its "direct" cost component and its avoided damage cost component; we then confront the two so as to evaluate its genuine cost. As damages avoided are equivalent to the benefits generated, this brings climate policies naturally in the realm of benefit-cost analysis. However, the sheer benefit-cost criterion may not be a sufficient incentive for a country to be induced to cooperate internationally, a necessary condition for an effective global climate policy. We therefore also explore how to make use of this criterion in the context of international climate cooperation.
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There is a growing interest in voluntary programmes for climate change mitigation, including greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction commitments. This paper gauges evidence on the support of citizens for climate change mitigation ...
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There is a growing interest in voluntary programmes for climate change mitigation, including greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction commitments. This paper gauges evidence on the support of citizens for climate change mitigation programmes at the local level, analysing voting behaviour. A quasi-experimental set-up is offered by the EU Covenant of Mayors (CoM) initiative, which is the mainstream European movement for local authorities voluntarily committing to meet and exceed the European Union 20% GHG emission reduction target by 2020. The electoral impact of the participation of Italian municipalities to the CoM is estimated, using an instrumental variable (IV) approach. Mayors committing to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in their municipality appear not to lose electoral support at subsequent elections; this is contrary to what would be implied by a simple (biased) ordinary least squares regression. Moreover, IV point estimates are positive, albeit insignificant at standard levels; this could be due to the possibility of some support of citizens for emission reduction commitments. Finally, strong heterogeneity in socio-economic and demographic characteristics is found, with support of the CoM being more pronounced in wealthier and younger cities. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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